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Money managementAlthough power struggles between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law in the South Asian household
remain an enduring theme of feminist scholarship, current policy discourse on ‘women’s economic
empowerment’ in the Global South tends to focus on married women’s power over their husband; this
neglects intergenerational power dynamics. The aim of this study was to describe and analyze the pro-
cesses involved in young, married women’s negotiations of control over cash inside the extended house-
hold in a contemporary rural Nepali setting. We conducted a grounded theory study of 42 households
from the Plains of Nepal. Our study uncovered multiple ways in which junior wives and husbands in
the extended household became secret allies in seeking financial autonomy from the rule of the
mother-in-law to the wife. This included secretly saving up for a household separation from the in-
laws. We argue these secret financial strategies constitute a means for junior couples to renegotiate
the terms of Kandiyoti’s (1988) ‘patriarchal bargain’ wherein junior wives traditionally had to accept sub-
servience to their husband and mother-in-law in exchange for economic security and eventual authority
over their own daughters-in-law. Researchers, activists and policy-makers concerned with women’s eco-
nomic empowerment in comparable contexts should consider the impact of intergenerational power
relations on women’s control over cash.
 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Women’s empowerment is widely recognized as an important
policy priority (UN General Assembly, 2015), a key component of
global strategies to promote health (Every Women Every Child,
2017) and combat poverty (World Bank, 2012), and an integral part
of the development process (Fielding & Lepine, 2017). Women’s
economic empowerment, a sub-component of their wider empow-
erment, can be defined as ‘the process which increases women’s
real power over economic decisions that influence their lives and
priorities in society’ (Tornqvist & Schmitz, 2009). Economic devel-
opment programs and policies to promote women’s economic
empowerment in low-resource countries often seek to reduce sex
disparities in access to cash, savings, credit and income (Buvinic
& Furst-Nichols, 2014) based on the theoretical justification that
improved market opportunities for women outside the householdought to strengthen their bargaining power inside the household
(Doss, 2013).
However, an exclusive focus on sex disparities in economic out-
comes is problematic, as women’s economic empowerment is not
only constrained by power relations between men and women, but
also by oppression of women by women (Cornwall, 2007; Vera-
Sanso, 2008). In particular, a large and well-established body of
anthropological literature has analyzed the central role of inter-
generational power struggles between daughters-in-law and
mothers-in-law in shaping household dynamics in South Asia
(Allendorf, 2017; Bennett, 1983, 1992; Kandiyoti, 1988;
Mandelbaum, 1993; Minturn & Kapoor, 1993; Vera-Sanso, 1999).
Nonetheless, relatively little of this literature has applied the lens
of intergenerational power struggle to analyzing women’s eco-
nomic empowerment.
We present findings from a grounded theory study on the inter-
generational power dynamics of money management within rural
Nepali households. These power dynamics remain a critical area of
concern for feminist researchers (Bennett, 2013; Dwyer & Bruce,
1988; Young, Wolkowitz, & McCullagh, 1981), because women’s
control over key economic resources is more important to their
194 L. Gram et al. /World Development 112 (2018) 193–204agency than mere ownership over resources or participation in
income-generation (Kabeer, 1999). The aim of this study is to
describe and analyze the processes involved in young, married
women’s negotiations of control over cash inside the extended
household in a contemporary rural Nepali setting.1 Our findings
extend existing theories of women’s economic empowerment by
examining the complex processes of negotiation, contestation and
subversion (Kabeer, 1999) involved in asserting power over cash.
We show that junior wives and their husbands often have common
cause for working together rather than opposing one another in the
joint household, which leads to husbands being supportive of their
wives’ financial autonomy, while mothers-in-law are opposed to it.
We argue that intergenerational power relations may be just as
important as male-female power relations in determining women’s
control over cash in our context.
2. Literature review
Kandiyoti (1988) famously posited that women living in
patrilocal-patrilineal households in the ‘patriarchal belt’
(Caldwell, 1978) stretching from North Africa over the Middle East
to South and East Asia ‘strategize within a set of concrete con-
straints [termed] the patriarchal bargain’2 (p. 275). According to this
‘bargain’, young brides are made to accept deprivation, hardship and
subservience to their husband and mother-in-law in exchange for
economic security through their husband and married sons and con-
trol over their own daughters-in-law in due time. As married men
become simultaneously responsible for the economic well-being of
both wife and mother, a conflict of interest emerges between
mother-in-law and daughter-in-law over the allegiance of the same
man. However, Kandiyoti (1988) also emphasized that such bargains
are neither uncontested nor immutable, but ‘susceptible to historical
transformations that open up new areas of struggle and renegotia-
tion of the relations between genders’ (p. 275).
Indeed, as indicated in Lynn Bennett’s (1983) ethnography of
upper-caste Hindu households in Nepal, a parallel bargain is often
made by junior males who exchange deference to their father and
elder brothers for the opportunity to succeed them at their time of
death or senility. Junior males can opt out of this bargain by asking
for a ‘household separation’, i.e. a partition of the family estate and
the relocation of the junior couple into a new place of residence.
However, such a demand forfeits the junior couple’s right to eco-
nomic support from the extended household and is widely seen
as a betrayal of the Hindu ideal of the joint household. As put by
Bennett (1983):
‘[T]he point is that every young married couple . . . face a choice
of strategies. They may accept the [patrilineal] ideal and wait to
succeed their elders after a prolonged period of dependency. Or
they may reject [patrilineal] authority and establish their own
separate household. It is this choice which lies at the root of
the proverbial tension between mothers and daughters-in-law
and the similar but less admissible tension between fathers
and sons.’ (p. 186)Similar observations have been reported throughout South Asia
in both Hindu and Muslim populations (Foster, 1993;
Mandelbaum, 1993; Minturn & Kapoor, 1993; Shah, 1988). Given1 In-depth analyses of the determinants of female labor force participation,
women’s rights to land or their control over durable marital assets lie outside the
scope of this article, as these topics have already been treated extensively elsewhere
(Agarwal, 1994; Bennett, 1992; Deere & Doss, 2006; Minturn & Kapoor, 1993).
2 Strictly speaking, Kandiyoti’s (1988) concept of a ‘patriarchal bargain’ applies
outside the patriarchal belt as well, but in this article, we focus exclusively on the
patriarchal bargain as defined for the patriarchal belt, a system of patriarchy that
Kandiyoti (1988) called ‘classic patriarchy’.the widely known nature of such conflicts, it is perhaps surprising
that existing literature in South Asia or comparable contexts on
women’s economic empowerment has paid relatively little atten-
tion to the role of intergenerational power dynamics in shaping
women’s control over cash inside the household (Vera-Sanso,
2008). A large body of work in economic bargaining theory3 has
explored women’s bargaining power in their spousal relationship
(Agarwal, 1997; Doss, 2013; Richards et al., 2013), but, to our knowl-
edge, few empirical studies have analyzed women’s bargaining
power vis-à-vis their in-laws or their own adult offspring. Similarly,
anthropological studies of household management of money in Ban-
gladesh (Kabeer, 1997; Kibria, 1995), Turkey (Eroglu, 2009) and
Egypt (Hoodfar, 1997) have focused on women’s negotiations over
money in their spousal relationship. Chowbey’s (2017) study of
South Asian women’s strategies for coping with economic abuse in
Britain, India and Pakistan analyzed men’s abuse of power over
women, which was ascribed to ‘patriarchal norms such as cultural
constructions of money and masculinity’ (p. 466). Vera-Sanso’s work
on urban families in Tamil Nadu addressed issues of female labor
force participation and filial old-age support, but did not explore
the power dynamics between junior and senior women over the
use of cash inside the extended household (Vera-Sanso, 2000,
2005, 2012).
A notable exception is the work by Singh and Bhandari (2012)
and Singh (1996, 2006) who pointed out that, within the joint
Indian household, ‘the emphasis is not on the relative decision-
making power of the husband versus wife. Decision-making power
rests usually with the husband’s parents, but changes as the
daughter-in-law gains more status and power in the household’
(p. 383) (Singh, 2006). Urban middle- and upper-class parents
often have joint bank accounts with their adult children and Indian
law recognizes the Hindu Undivided Family as a legal construct for
tax purposes (Singh, 1996). In a study of money management in 27
urban middle-income Indian households, Singh and Bhandari
(2012) reported that male household members predominantly
had the final say on major financial decisions in both joint and
nuclear households. However, the day-to-day management of
household monies was almost exclusively carried out by women
in nuclear households, while the same task was chiefly the respon-
sibility of men in joint households.
Nonetheless, Singh and Bhandari (2012) did not provide disag-
gregated data on decision-making power in joint households
between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law or between fathers
and sons. Their study was also primarily descriptive and offered
few explanations for the observed distribution of power apart from
an ‘ideology of male dominance and male control’ (p. 60). In line
with previous anthropological studies on money management in
South Asia, Singh and Bhandari (2012) also only sampled urban
households. Thus, there is a need for more research on money
management in rural populations where household economies
are more reliant on subsistence production (Whitehead, 1984).
In the next sections, we will present the study context followed
by the data collection and analysis methods for our study. After-
wards, we present our study findings and conclude with a discus-
sion of the theoretical and practical implications of our findings.3 In this article, we have largely refrained from drawing upon economic bargaining
theory (Doss, 2013) as a framework for analyzing household dynamics. This is due to
our focus on the ever-shifting intra-household processes of bargaining, negotiation
and subversion (Kabeer, 1999) involved in realizing women’s agency. While the
economic bargaining literature has uncovered numerous causal relationships
between inputs into women’s fallback position (such as their income, wealth or
educational status) and economic outcomes (such as household budget allocations on
‘female goods’), it has paid less attention to the agentic process of translating
women’s resources into outcomes (Kabeer, 1999).
L. Gram et al. /World Development 112 (2018) 193–204 1953. Methods
3.1. Study context
The research reported in this article was part of a large-scale
cluster randomized controlled trial in the Mahottari and Dhanusha
districts of Nepal, bordering Bihar state in India (Saville et al.,
2016). The primary aim of the trial was to evaluate the impact of
participatory women’s groups either alone or combined with food
or cash transfers, on birth weight. This sub-study was conducted as
part of a wider effort to understand the household context under-
lying rural, pregnant women’s ability to control monthly uncondi-
tional cash transfers that were provided to them in the trial.
Mother and Infant Research Activities (MIRA), a Nepalese research
NGO, ran trial activities on the ground from 13 Feb 2014 until 10
October 2015, in collaboration with the UN World Food Program
and Save the Children. The full design of the trial has been reported
elsewhere (Saville et al., 2016).
For the purposes of our current study it is important to under-
stand the socio-cultural context of the trial. The total population of
the districts is 1.4 million, 87% are Hindu and 11% Muslim. Male
foreign labor migration is widespread with top destinations being
India, Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Malaysia (Ministry
of Labour and Migration, 2014). A study of local pregnant women
aged 15–45, found that 36% of women’s husbands had migrated
abroad, mostly to Middle Eastern countries (61.5%), India (27.9%)
or Malaysia (8.8%) (Gram et al., 2018). The same survey also found
that 87% of these women lived in joint households, 9% lived sepa-
rately from their in-laws, and 4% of households had experienced
the death of the mother-in-law (Gram et al., 2018).
The local language and majority culture is Maithili. As the
second-largest language in Nepal, 3 million native Maithili speak-
ers live in Nepal (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012). 30 million live
in India (Lewis, 2016). Maithili culture shares many similarities to
cultures in the ‘purdah belt’ (Mandelbaum, 1993) comprising
North India, Bangladesh and Pakistan including the predominance
of the patrilocal-patrilineal household (Agarwal, 1994). A house-
hold hierarchy operates where higher-ranking members are ‘guar-
dians’ of lower-ranking members, with attendant duties to
supervise their conduct and ensure their physical and social
well-being (Morrison et al., 2018). Guardianship is determined by
age and gender, thus mothers-in-law are guardians of daughters-
in-law and fathers are guardians of their sons, but other household
members can take over the guardianship role, if the existing guar-
dian dies or reaches senility.
Pro-natalist social norms put considerable pressure on newly
married women to conceive of sons as quickly as possible. Families
where male family members work abroad often ensure newly mar-
ried daughters-in-law become pregnant before their husband
leaves the country. Sons are preferred over daughters to generate
labor and dowry income (Bennett, 1983). Women failing their
reproductive ‘obligations’ to become pregnant or give birth to a
son may be perceived to constitute a drain on the household econ-
omy and risk abandonment in the early years of their marriage
(Clarke et al., 2014). Mothers without sons have been found to
experience extreme psychological distress, as they are taunted by
their guardians and neighbors for ‘never having had a son in their
womb’/niputar and are believed to suffer from a curse (Clarke et al.,
2014).
Female seclusion norms stigmatize married women’s free
movement in public spaces and prevent newly married
daughters-in-law from leaving the house (Acharya & Bennett,
1983; Morrison et al., 2018). Local women and men use the collo-
quialism, ‘the frog in the well’/inaar ke beng, to describe newly
married women’s sense of being trapped in the house with fewopportunities for escape (Gram et al., 2018). Physically leaving
the house does not in itself constitute a breach of social norms,
but women who are perceived as loitering without a purpose pro-
voke connotations of sexual availability and impropriety (Gram,
2018). Women who wish to physically leave the confines of the
home usually require explicit permission from a senior family
member and the provision of an escort to signal that they have
entered the public sphere for a legitimate purpose. Women living
in nuclear families have greater mobility, as their de facto status
as the eldest woman of their household justifies their public
presence.
3.2. Data collection
We used a grounded theory methodology (Corbin & Strauss,
2008) to develop and extend existing theories of household money
management for our local context. Our sampling frame and topic
guides evolved over time, to explore emergent themes over the
course of data collection. This involved an iterative loop of con-
ducting interviews, transcribing audio recordings, analyzing data,
focusing topic guides and sampling new respondents based on
prior data analysis. The purpose of this process was to maximize
our chances of inductively developing a rich, nuanced theory with
a coherent logic where all the theoretical categories were con-
nected to one another and no major explanatory gaps were left.
Over the course of this cycle, we asked male and female respon-
dents about household management of money, attitudes to
women’s economic autonomy, support and conflict in the house-
hold, separation from the joint household, family honor and friend-
ships, experiences with male migration, and women’s experiences
of pregnancy.
At the time of the study, districts in Nepal were divided into Vil-
lage Development Committees (VDCs). Table 1 provides a short
description of the VDCs where interviews took place. All the VDCs
belonged to the cash transfer arm of the wider trial. In this paper,
respondent quotes are labelled with a pseudonym for the VDC
where interviews were conducted and a serial number to maintain
respondent anonymity.
Table 2 shows the characteristics of female respondents. We
conducted semi-structured interviews with 22 currently or
recently pregnant daughters-in-law and their guardians. We exclu-
sively sampled currently or recently pregnant daughters-in-law, as
this was the target population of the wider trial. The guardians
were usually mothers-in-law (n = 15), but were sometimes elder
sisters-in-law (n = 3) in cases where the mother-in-law had died.
We sampled daughters-in-law to ensure variation in geographical
region, caste, socio-economic status, education, nuclear versus
joint household, and husband’s migrant status. Due to low levels
of ethnic variability in our geographical context, we did not sample
based on ethnicity. We did not explicitly sample guardians based
on any criteria, but instead interviewed any consenting guardian
of a sampled daughter-in-law.
Pilot interviews indicated mothers-in-law were reluctant to let
us interview their daughter-in-law in private, while daughters-in-
law felt intimidated by the prospect of discussing household mat-
ters in front of their mother-in-law. We therefore conducted con-
current but separate interviews with daughters-in-law and their
guardian, in two separate locations around the household. While
the daughter-in-law was interviewed in her room, the guardian
was simultaneously interviewed alone in an outside location, such
as under a tree or in a nearby field. This ensured a high degree of
privacy for the daughter-in-law, as male household members were
at work and other female household members may have presumed
our interview with the mother-in-law was more significant and of
greater interest. A similar design is sometimes used in Western
Table 1
Characteristics of VDCs where interviews were held.
VDC %
Dalit
%
Muslim
% Women with no
education
% Below median regional
wealth levels
Travel time to district headquarters by
motorbike
Travel time to Indian border by
motorbike
Kote 31.6% 3.7% 63.1% 73.5% 2–4 h >1 h
Jamal 13.1% 49.9% 78.9% 46.9% 1–2 h >1 h
Sahku 19.3% 1.6% 48.4% 36.8% 30 mins 30 mins
Lalit 10.9% 0.3% 60.4% 61.2% 2–4 h >1 h
Dahak 22.5% 10.2% 63.6% 60.5% 30 mins 45 mins
At the time of the study, districts in Nepal were divided into Village Development Committees (VDCs). All VDCs belonged to the cash transfer arm of the trial. Pseudonyms
have been created to serve as VDC names to ensure the confidentiality and anonymity of the interviewees. All % have been estimated from surveillance data in the wider
randomized controlled trial. Wealth levels were derived using an asset index (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001). Travel times to the Indian border indicate links to foreign trade, while
travel times to district headquarters indicate links to domestic trade.
Table 2
Female respondent characteristics.
Household characteristics Mother-in-law/Elder sister-in-
law
Daughter-in-law
Serial
no.
VDC Caste SES Nuclear/Joint
household
Husband working
abroad?
Family relation Grades
passed
Age Grades
passed
Pregnant?
1 Sahku Dalit Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 20 7 No, baby 5 months
2 Sahku Dalit Low Nuclear Yes, Middle East Mother-in-law 0 25 0 No, baby 7 months
3 Sahku Brahmin High Joint No Sister-in-law 7 21 8 No, baby 6 months
4 Sahku Brahmin High Joint No Mother-in-law 0 21 8 No, baby 4 months
5 Sahku Middle
Madhesi
Low Nuclear No Mother-in-law 0 21 7 No, baby 1.5 months
6 Sahku Middle
Madhesi
Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 21 5 Yes, 7 months
7 Sahku Middle
Madhesi
High Joint Yes Middle East Mother-in-law 0 24 8 No, baby 5 months
8 Sahku Brahmin High Joint No Mother-in-law 7 20 12 No, age of baby
unknown
9 Sahku Dalit Low Joint No Mother-in-law 0 30 0 No, baby 5 months
10 Sahku Middle
Madhesi
High Nuclear No MIL refused
consent
21 0 Yes, 8 months
1 Kote Dalit Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 20 14 Yes, 8 months
2 Kote Dalit Low Nuclear No Equipment
failure
25 5 No, baby 5 months
3 Kote Dalit Low Joint Yes, Middle East Sister-in-law 0 18 6 No, baby 1 month
4 Kote Dalit Low Joint Yes Mother-in-law 0 25 8 No, age of baby
unknown
5 Kote Dalit Middle Nuclear Yes, Middle East Mother-in-law 0 25 0 Yes, 7 months
6 Kote Dalit Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 20 0 No, baby 1 month
7 Kote Dalit Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 22 12 No, baby 7 months
8 Kote Middle
Madhesi
Low Joint Deceased Mother-in-law 0 20 3 No, baby 2 months
1 Jamal Dalit Middle Joint Yes MIL refused
consent
20 0 No, baby 4 months
2 Jamal Middle
Madhesi
High Joint Yes, Malaysia Mother-in-law 0 25 8 No, baby 6 months
3 Jamal Dalit Low Nuclear No Sister-in-law 0 25 8 No, baby 3 months
4 Jamal Dalit Low Joint Yes, Delhi MIL refused
consent
17 5 No, age of baby
unknown
Socioeconomic status was appraised by local informants and adjusted based on interview data in case of discrepancies. Destination country of migration was not reported for
respondent 4, Kote and 1, Jamal. Ages for mothers-in-law/elder sisters-in-law not provided, as mothers-in-law had difficulties reporting their age exactly, although it ranged
from 50 to 80 years. All daughters-in-law gave consent. All respondents were of Hindu faith.
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interviews (Hertz, 1995). None of the daughters-in-law refused
consent, but three mothers-in-law refused consent because they
did not have the time. In these cases, we still interviewed their
daughter-in-law alone. The recording of one mother-in-law was
lost due to equipment failure.
We also interviewed 20 husbands to explore male perspectives
on household finances. This was necessary to obtain a complete
picture of household finances, as female household members were
often excluded from discussions involving male household mem-
bers and Maithili sexual taboos strongly prohibited casual commu-
nication between female household members and their elder male
in-laws (Gram, 2018). Table 3 shows the male respondents’ charac-teristics and the pregnancy status of their wives. All husbands were
married to currently or recently pregnant women. One husband’s
wife had an abortion, one suffered a miscarriage and one recently
experienced the death of their newborn. The husbands were also
sampled to ensure variation in geographical region, caste, socio-
economic status, education, and nuclear versus joint household.
The husbands were all interviewed alone in an outside location.
To interview the husbands, we chose not to revisit the original
households where we had interviewed female household mem-
bers, as this might impose excessive time burdens on households
in the context of repeated quantitative surveys on nutrition and
health from the wider trial. Even so, five men refused to participate
because they did not have time. One husband expressed offence at
Table 3
Male respondent characteristics.
Serial no. VDC Caste SES Nuclear/joint household Age Grades passed Interview taken? Wife pregnant?
1 Dahak Middle Madhesi II Nuclear 40 0 Yes No, baby 1 month old
2 Dahak Middle Madhesi IV Joint 30 9 No, consent refusal No, baby 18 days’ old
3 Dahak Middle Madhesi IV Nuclear 26 4 Yes No, baby 17 days’ old
4 -Dahak Middle Madhesi V Joint 28 8 Yes No, baby 2 months old
5 Dahak Dalit I Nuclear 30 0 No, consent refusal No, baby 1 month old
6 Dahak Dalit I Joint ? 0 Yes No, baby 6 months old
7 Dahak Middle Madhesi IV Joint 22 11 Yes No, baby 1 month old
8 Dahak Middle Madhesi I Joint 23 4 Yes No, wife had an abortion
9 Dahak Middle Madhesi V Joint 28 13 No, consent refusal Unknown
10 Dahak Muslim I Joint 26 0 No, moved abroad Unknown
11 Dahak Dalit I ? ? 0 No, consent refusal Unknown
1 Lalit Middle Madhesi III Joint 23 6 Yes No, baby 14 days’ old
2 Lalit Middle Madhesi V Joint 38 8 Yes No, baby 1 month old
3 Lalit Middle Madhesi I Joint 32 6 Yes No, baby 1 month old
4 Lalit Middle Madhesi III Joint 31 0 Yes Yes
5 Lalit Middle Madhesi II Nuclear 29 0 Yes Yes
6 Lalit Middle Madhesi IV Nuclear 41 8 Yes Yes
7 Lalit Middle Madhesi III Joint 24 11 Yes No, baby 1 month old
8 Lalit Dalit II Joint 24 5 No, consent refusal Unknown
9 Lalit Middle Madhesi V Joint 26 10 No, moved abroad Unknown
1 Jamal Middle Madhesi V Joint 28 6 Yes No, baby 1 month old
2 Jamal Middle Madhesi III Nuclear 32 5 Yes No, baby 1 month old
3 Jamal Dalit I Joint 25 0 Yes No, baby 1 day old
4 Jamal Muslim III Joint 35 0 Yes Yes
5 Jamal Middle Madhesi III Joint 28 0 Yes No, wife suffered miscarriage
6 Jamal Muslim III Nuclear 44 0 Yes No, baby died
7 Jamal Middle Madhesi V Joint 25 7 Yes No, baby 2 months old
8 Jamal Muslim I Joint 40 0 No, consent refusal Unknown
SES reflects socioeconomic quintiles calculated using an asset index (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001) from surveillance data from the wider randomized controlled trial, I = lowest
socioeconomic status, V = highest. Husbands 6 and 11 in Dahak VDC did not provide information on their age. Husband 11 in Dahak did not provide information on household
structure.
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bands are often more challenging to interview than wives due to
their need to leave for work early in the morning and spend time
with the family in the evening. By comparison, young, married
women’s restricted mobility facilitates consent. The moderately
high refusal rate of husbands (5 out of 28) presents a concern that
consenting husbands may differ from non-consenting husbands,
for example by having more cooperative spousal relations. We
addressed this by triangulating our findings from the husbands
with those of the wives and their guardians who were sampled
from entirely separate households.
All interviews with both women and men were audio recorded
and lasted one to two hours. At the end of the data collection pro-
cess, we were approaching saturation as new analytical insights
arising from further interviews became increasingly rare. Nonethe-
less, emergent hypotheses about the influence of pregnancy and
childbearing on women’s control over cash could have been
explored in greater depth by sampling married women who were
neither pregnant nor had young children.4 The term ‘financial guardian’ was invented for the purposes of this article to
describe a relatively fixed set of roles and responsibilities related to the management
of money in the Maithili household. None of the respondents themselves used the
term describe a member of their household, although the word ‘guardian’ is in
common use throughout the Plains of Nepal.3.3. Data analysis
Native Maithili speakers directly transcribed and translated the
data from the audio recordings into written English. The first
author (LG) performed the coding and analysis of the translated
data. For each transcript, reflective notes were written using ana-
lytical tools from grounded theory followed by open and selective
coding. To reduce cultural bias, stimulate reflective analysis and
ensure analytic rigor, LG discussed findings and interpretations of
the data with interviewers, translators and co-authors throughout
data collection and analysis. At the end of the analysis process, all
the ideas, concepts and relationships were integrated into a single
‘storyline’ to check for logical consistency.4. Results
4.1. Financial management in the joint household
The overarching goal of financial management in joint Maithili
households was referred to by respondents as ‘fulfilling the needs
of family members’. This was primarily realized through an ideol-
ogy of ‘financial guardianship’, where a key person, the ‘financial
guardian’,4 was entitled to physically receive and manage most
household income. The financial guardian was not always the house-
hold head. The household head might have the final say over finan-
cial matters and make decisions with broad economic impacts such
as house construction or business investments. By comparison, the
financial guardian physically received the household income, man-
aged day-to-day expenditure decisions, allocated purchased goods
among household members, and coordinated borrowing, lending
and saving operations. Indeed, many husbands explained that natu-
rally no-one saved up money separately, since they all lived together
in a joint household. One husband even commented that centrally
managed household income was one of the defining characteristics
of a joint household:
Husband: If every earner keeps his income for himself then there is
no need of guardianship and the household will automatically
break up [into smaller units].
[husband 4, Dahak]
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financial guardianship due to their high rank in the household,
their standing and social networks in the community and their
experience with the village economy. Patrilineal inheritance cus-
toms meant they were the only household members who could
credibly offer moneylenders the family estate as collateral for the
large loans necessary to sponsor foreign labor migration, marriage
of daughters, or house construction projects. However, mothers-in-
law were often preferred to fathers-in-law as financial guardians
for three key reasons: First, in a context where only the wealthiest
households had a bank account, women needed to know the phys-
ical location of valuable household assets to safeguard them from
theft while male household members were out for work during
the day. This made female household members more ‘natural’ can-
didates for physically receiving and guarding household cash. One
NGO staff member explained in English that ‘in Nepal, women are
just like a bank’. Second, widely shared gendered expectations that
it was the duty of women to handle matters of food preparation
and serving led most husbands to avoid any involvement in the
day-to-day budgeting of (mostly food-related) expenditures.
Finally, many husbands felt that it was ‘the nature of women’
[husband 3, Jamal] to save money; thus ‘sensible’ husbands let
female household members physically control the household
money to prevent it from being wasted on expensive meat or
alcohol.
Regardless of how tasks and responsibilities were shared
between mothers-in-law and fathers-in-law,5 the overall system
invariably left junior husbands and wives disempowered as they nei-
ther qualified for financial guardianship nor for household headship.
Thus, households needed to reach a compromise between the need
for central coordination and the need for financial autonomy. Indeed,
a counter-ideology of ‘personal property’ existed where individuals
had a right/haq to their own private money, particularly earned
money, which they could dispose of however they liked. Household
members sometimes had individual personal lockers in which they
could store private money, and young brides received a trunk/peti
with a secure lock upon marriage from their natal family where they
could store their private possessions. Households allowed male
earners to keep a small portion of their income for personal usage,
called ‘pocket money’ (sic), while requiring them to hand over the
rest to the financial guardian. Female income earners, on the other
hand, had to hand over the full amount to the financial guardian,
whether they were daughters-in-law or mothers-in-law.
We found a few exceptions to the predominant pattern of
money management. In one household, income-earners alternated
in contributing to the household fund [daughter-in-law 2, Jamal].
The daughter-in-law lived with her husband, brother-in-law, co-
daughter-in-law, mother-in-law and father-in-law. Every month,5 A substantial body of sociological literature on household money management in
both the Global South (Singh & Bhandari, 2012; Kabeer, 1997) and Global North
(Bennett, 2013) has sought to clarify the distinction between ‘control’ over money,
which is ‘linked to the power to make major financial decisions or prevent discussion
about these decisions’ (p. 47) (Singh & Bhandari, 2012) and ‘management’ of money,
which refers to the practice of ‘organizing money in the household on a day-to-day
basis’ (p. 47) (Singh & Bhandari, 2012). This distinction roughly corresponds to the
difference in roles and responsibilities for a ‘household head’ and a ‘financial
guardian’ in our context. However, after reviewing over 20 years’ of research into
household money management, Bennett (2013) concluded that ‘a strict distinction
between management and control may be hard to retain’ (p. 586). Indeed, a mother-
in-law in our sample acting as a financial guardian might be able to take out a major
loan without the explicit approval of the father-in-law due to her trusted role as a
financial manager. At the same time, fathers-in-law might weigh in on the type of
food that is bought and prepared and expect to be obeyed. Since our study was
primarily concerned with intergenerational tensions over household money, the
precise boundary between the duties of a mother-in-law vis-à-vis a father-in-law or a
‘household head’ vis-à-vis a ‘financial guardian’ is of lesser import: As compared to
the senior in-laws, junior husbands and wives had usually neither the right to
‘manage’ nor the right to ‘control’ money in the household.either her husband or her brother-in-law were responsible for pay-
ing the joint expenses of the whole household. In months, where
neither could afford this, the mother-in-law and father-in-law paid
out. This household was a highly educated, well-connected family
whose junior male and female members had a Bachelor’s Degree
level or were studying for one, and whose youngest children
attended boarding school in Kathmandu. As such this household
was highly unusual in our sample. In another household
[daughter-in-law 7, Kote], the mother-in-law became ostracized
from her family and sent to live in a small hut after her husband,
the main income earner of the household, died. Instead, the oldest
daughter-in-law took over as financial guardian in the household.
However, money management practices did not vary systemati-
cally in our sample according to caste, aggregate household wealth,
the relative size of household members’ earnings or their relative
levels of education. Money management practices also did not vary
systematically by women’s pregnancy status.
4.2. Financial risks for daughters-in-law in the joint household
Female seclusion norms precluded daughters-in-law in joint
households from visiting amarket on her own, leaving them depen-
dent on other household members to buy what they needed.6 Door-
to-door salesmen provided regular opportunities to buy food, clothes,
kitchenware and cosmetics, and daughters-in-law sometimes sent
their children out to purchase from the local village shop. However,
prices were higher for such purchases than at the marketplace. If
daughters-in-law wanted to procure items from the market they
would have to ask their financial guardian for money to give a senior
female or male household member to take with them to the market.
Such requests needed to be justified on a case-by-case basis.
Mothers-in-law were significantly less restrained by mobility
norms; they frequently took out loans, shopped at the market or
participated in savings and credit groups as part of their role as
financial guardians. However, allowing daughters-in-law to have
any personal cash was perceived by mothers-in-law as a major
concession of power, as it was their responsibility and privilege
to regulate daily financial transactions. Thus, the needs of
daughters-in-law should only be met through purchases that had
been approved by them:
Interviewer: Do you allow your daughter-in-law to have her own
savings?
Mother-in-law: No, I do not allow her. . .Why does she need to have
her own money? Presently, we are there to do everything for her.
She will have her own money when the appropriate time comes.
[mother-in-law 4, Sahku]However, daughters-in-law often felt dissatisfied with this sys-
tem. Although a few instances of genuinely caring and supportive6 One concern is whether the mobility of daughters-in-law in our sample was
unusually low due to their perinatal status. While many daughters-in-law and their
guardians reported the presence of small children presenting an obstacle to their
mobility, this was rarely the only factor. Family members overwhelmingly stated they
denied daughters-in-law permission to go out in public due to a concern with
breaching seclusion norms and daughters-in-law explicitly attributed their lack of
mobility to such norms. Daughters-in-law were conversely able to move freely when
this was socially acceptable. Thus, daughters-in-law frequently went to the market
place in their natal village [daughter-in-law 6, 8, 10, Sahku; daughter-in-law 6, 7,
Kote], if they had a suitable escort [daughter-in-law 1, 2, 4, Jamal; daughter-in-law 5,
8, Kote; daughter-in-law 5, 10, Sahku], or if the market was distant enough to remove
the risk of running into neighbors [daughter-in-law 7, Kote; daughter-in-law 3, 7,
Sahku]. While the perinatal status of our respondents may have played a role in
making their mobility more challenging, these norm-based constraints on mobility
likely persisted even after pregnancy and childbirth. In fact, a few respondents stated
that carrying a small child facilitated mobility by legitimizing the presence of the
daughter-in-law in public [daughter-in-law 7, Sahku; elder sister-in-law 3, Kote]. We
thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this concern.
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law,7 almost all daughters-in-law felt ignored and excluded in the
household, as they held little to no right to participate in financial
decisions. Several daughters-in-law explained that any attempt to
even ask about the prices of goods would be seen by their mother-
in-law as challenging her financial authority.
Interviewer: Since you never go to the market, do you know the
price of goods in the area? Things like rice, vegetables, potato or
other things?
Daughter-in-law: Only those people who go know the price of
goods. . .I don’t know them.
Interviewer: Do you ask your family members about such prices?
Daughter-in-law: No, I don’t ask. . .[If I asked,] they might think
I’m taking down a balance record of their purchases. My mother-
in-law says this to me. Don’t you know the rules of the village?
[daughter-in-law 6, Kote]
According to the financial norms of the joint household,
daughters-in-law should be able to ask their mother-in-law when-
ever they needed anything. In practice, they often felt both embar-
rassed and humiliated for having to constantly ask for small
amounts of cash. Daughters-in-law particularly worried about
the ability or willingness of their in-laws to pay for their food
and health care costs, and often found themselves in the difficult
position of being simultaneously responsible for their own chil-
dren’s welfare while being disempowered from making financial
decisions on their behalf. Such experiences caused significant psy-
chological distress:
Interviewer: How did you feel about being left out of money mat-
ters in the household?
Daughter-in-law: I felt very bad. I was stressed and worried. I did
not want to talk to anyone and I used to think too much. I could not
even look at my children’s faces.
[daughter-in-law 9, Sahku]
Daughter-in-law: But these days I am suffering from a lack of
money in my household. No-one can understand it except me. . .I
can’t express my feelings to anyone else. Who do I tell my feelings
to? No-one would believe me. . .What else can I do? I can’t do any-
thing except cry.
[daughter-in-law 4, Kote]
According to the patriarchal bargain, daughters-in-law were
supposed to ascend the household hierarchy after the birth or mar-
riage of their own son. In reality, the birth or marriage of a son was
far from guaranteed to ensure greater control over finances for
junior daughters-in-law. Some daughters-in-law who had lived
with their mother-in-law for 7–15 years and had brought their
own daughters-in-law into the household, still reported having
no say over household financial decisions8 [daughter-in-law 4,7 In three instances, daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law both reported having
genuinely caring and supportive relationships with one another. In two of three
instances, the family had recently undergone powerful possibly traumatic experi-
ences, which could have triggered a sense of shared adversity and interdependence
among family members. In one case, the husband had recently unexpectedly passed
away at an early age [daughter-in-law 8, Kote]. In another instance [daughter-in-law
8, Sahku], the husband had formerly been kidnapped by Maoist insurgents who
demanded a ransom for returning him. In two out of three instances, the incentives
between daughter-in-law and mother-in-law were better aligned, since the husband’s
income was not available to either of the two. As mentioned, one husband had passed
away [daughter-in-law 8, Kote]. In a second case, the husband had ‘gone renegade’
and refused to share his income with any other family members [daughter-in-law 6,
Sahku]. In all three cases, daughters-in-law felt no need to accumulate secret savings,
because the care and support received from their mothers-in-law fulfilled their needs.
8 Even a 15-year-old son may be married to a girl due to the high prevalence of
child marriage in our context (Raj, McDougal, & Rusch, 2012). It is also important to
bear in mind that the number of years of marriage being reported by our respondents
are likely inexact due to high rates of illiteracy in our population.Kote; daughter-in-law 9, Sahku]. When asked about the expected
time taken for daughters-in-law to be involved in household money
management, almost all daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law
replied they would have to wait for the current financial guardian’s
death or senility.
Importantly, many of the experiences reported by the
daughters-in-law, both old and young, fell within contemporary
definitions of economic violence (Chowbey, 2017; Fawole, 2008).
This included threatening them with physical violence if they were
found in possession of private cash [daughter-in-law 3, Kote],
withdrawing financial support for health care in life-threatening
situations [daughter-in-law 2, Kote], and withholding food as a
bargaining chip in household disputes [daughter-in-law 9, Sahku].
Daughters-in-law subjected to such treatment widely condemned
their household members for failing to satisfy their basic needs and
distributing resources inequitably among household members.
4.3. Secret savings as a strategy of acquiring agency
In theory, daughters-in-law could obtain disposable cash
through wage labor or investment in their own micro-enterprises
with local credit. In practice, this was extremely challenging.
Higher-ranking household members did not approve of
daughters-in-law taking out loans on their own, as they were too
junior to take out credit and imposed burdens on male income
earners to repay the loans. Senior household members also worried
about incurring reputational damage to the family if junior wives
ventured outside and violated female seclusion norms in the com-
munity. Daughters-in-law lacked the necessary ownership of col-
lateral and social connections to qualify for loans in the
community. Hindu daughters-in-law were particularly isolated as
customs of village exogamy meant they had left their friends and
family behind when they married to enter a new village as a
stranger.
In the case of wage labor, most daughters-in-law expressed a
strong desire to earn cash.
Daughter-in-law: I only get money when someone gives me. I am
not independent. I depend on others. And if I get money then, other
people may take it away and spend it. For all these reasons, I can’t
just go buy things for myself at the market.
Interviewer: Do you want to earn money yourself?
Daughter-in-law: Who does not want to earn money??
[daughter-in-law 2, Jamal]
However, daughters-in-law faced formidable barriers to doing
so. The substantially higher wage rates from foreign labor migra-
tion made local income earning opportunities seem meagre in
comparison;respondents reported receiving NPR 20,000–100,000
[USD 195–977] monthly per migrant earner compared to NPR
2000–10,000 [USD 20–98] per local male earner. Lack of education
and physical capital led most working women to take up agricul-
tural employment in a poorly paid labor market that devalued
their contribution.
Elder sister-in-law:We never receive cash for our work. Only men
get [wages]. A man can dig mud, use a spade or construct a build-
ing, but a woman cannot do such work. Can a woman do a man’s
job? No, no-one does. That’s why we never receive cash for our
work.
[elder sister-in-law 3, Kote]
Family members in all but the poorest households forbade
daughters-in-law to obtain employment to avoid dishonoring male
‘breadwinners’, breaching female seclusion norms, and impeding
the fulfilment of their domestic duties. As many respondents had
recently given birth to a small child, they also faced prohibitions
10
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family support also made it impractical for them to work, as many
husbands, mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law found it near-
unthinkable that they would care for the child of a daughter-in-
law just so she could obtain employment.
In this context, savings held a strong advantage over employ-
ment and credit as a source of cash, since husbands and wives
often had aligned incentives to allow the wife to accumulate her
own savings. Junior husbands were often just as powerless to influ-
ence financial decisions as daughters-in-law due to the need to
defer to either parents or older male siblings. Many husbands
revealed that they were routinely left out of both major and minor
financial discussions in the household and were aware that it was
not their place to participate. These husbands explained that any
attempt to involve themselves would be seen as a challenge to
authority.
Husband:My parents make purchases, I do not. My duty is to earn
money and hand it over to them. Apart from doing this, I know
nothing about money. My parents maintain our family. It is com-
pletely up to them. . . If they told me to buy anything, I would
buy it, but otherwise I do not. . . I cannot even buy a packet of a salt
of my own accord.
[husband 1, Jamal]
Husbands could sometimes retain pocket money from their
own earnings before handing it over to the financial guardian,
but still had to ask for money from their financial guardian for lar-
ger purchases who might deny their request. In one instance, a
husband wanted to send part of his earnings to pay off a debt his
wife owed a relative, but his father refused, even though the hus-
band was the main income-earner for the household [daughter-
in-law 3, Kote]. In another instance, a husband was forced against
his will to spend his income and his wife’s savings paying back a
huge loan (worth NPR 400,000–500,000 [USD 3908–4885]) taken
by his elder brother [daughter-in-law 10, Sahku]. Such husbands
felt exploited by their financial guardian and either expressed a
desire to formally separate from their parents or had already car-
ried out a household separation.
Compared to the cash controlled by their elders, husbands felt
they could easily access savings held by their own wives, since
poor employment opportunities and female seclusion norms
meant their wives depended on them to obtain more money and
execute purchases anyway. In many households, junior wives
accumulated koseliya, denoting ‘married women’s secret money’
in Maithili language,9 with the tacit consent of their husbands.
The most common strategies for doing so included saving up gifts
from one’s natal parents [daughter-in-law 7, Kote], manipulating
information about prices when claiming money for expenses
[daughter-in-law 1, Sahku], or selling off the household’s grain sur-
plus in secret [mentioned by husbands 6 from Lalit, and 7 and 8 from
Dahak]. One husband explained, he did not mind his wife’s secret
strategies, even if they involved a degree of ‘lying’:
Husband: To me, it’s a good thing. It does not matter if she lied to
me to get money, but if she has set some koseliya aside, then one
day, the money will benefit our family.
[Husband 2, Lalit]
Junior wives put considerable pressure on their husband to
directly provide them with savings from their earnings.
Daughters-in-law in our sample fiercely insisted that, as much as9 Koseliya is not to be confused with the Nepali word, koseli, which means ‘gift’.
Eroglu also found that women’s secret kitties were so common in parts of Turkey that
the colloquial term vallah billah kesesi (or ‘oath pouch’) was used for these (Eroglu,
2009). In parts of rural Bangladesh, women’s secret savings stores have also been
referred to as zolaitta (Naved, 2000).their husbands had a duty to contribute to the extended house-
hold, they also had a duty to ensure the financial well-being of
their wives and children. Caught between their duty to their wife
and children and their duty to their parents and siblings, husbands
often compromised by directly transferring a portion of their
income to their wives in secret. When they subsequently handed
over the remaining part of their income to the financial guardian,
they would omit to mention the portion of their income that had
been sent to their wives. For the many husbands working and liv-
ing abroad in the Middle East in our context, this was accom-
plished by sending home remittances in the name of the wife’s
natal parents. The amounts transferred through secret channels
were often considerably larger than the amounts received by
daughters-in-law through petitioning their in-laws. When
daughters-in-law reported receiving cash from their financial guar-
dians, the sums ranged from NPR 50–1000 [USD 0.5–9.8]. By com-
parison, income transferred through secret channels ranged from
NPR 5000–15,000 [USD 49–147] every two or three months.
4.4. Preparing for a household separation
Junior couples accumulating secret savings frequently worried
about the ramifications of being discovered:
Daughter-in-law: I was worried. . .It could become a big issue in
the household that a husband had sent secret money to his
wife. . .They might think that, although there were lots of loans to
be repaid, my husband was sending me [individual] allowances
for me and my children. . . I did not want my sisters-in-law to feel
they had been unfairly treated so I did not tell anyone.
[daughter-in-law 5, Kote]Extended household members also treated secret savings for
the wife with extreme suspicion.10 One daughter-in-law was imme-
diately accused of getting secret money from her husband when she
returned home with the cash transfer provided in the intervention
arm of the trial [daughter-in-law 7, Kote], while another daughter-
in-law hid the money she received from her natal parents for fear
her in-laws would make precisely such an allegation if they found
the money [daughter-in-law 3, Kote]. Mothers-in-law also explained
that if they allowed their son to provide their wives a portion of their
income, they would quickly lose control over both their son and
daughter-in-law [mother-in-law 4, Sahku; mother-in-law 5, Kote].
Part of the reason behind such intense suspicion was a fear that
the junior couple was preparing for a household separation. House-
hold separation carried strong economic disincentives, as the
junior couple could no longer claim financial support from their
in-laws and had to arrange for their own living expenses, including
the cost of building a new home. Indeed, several daughters-in-law
living in households where they suffered psychological and physi-
cal violence from their in-laws could not persuade their husbands
to move out due to such financial considerations [daughter-in-law
9, Sahku; daughter-in-law 3, Kote]. Thus, several husbands and
mothers-in-law explained that the accumulation of secret savings
was often part of a wider strategy to insure the junior couple
against financial risk [husband 2, Lalit; husband 6, Dahak;
mother-in-law 4, Sahku; mother-in-law 5, Kote]. Separated nuclear
couples also reported accumulating secret savings before their sep-
aration occurred [daughter-in-law 5, Kote; husband 8, Dahak].Note, the widespread nature of secret savings is perfectly consistent with the
existence of strong disapproval of such practices by other household members.
Empirically prevalent behavior does not have to be morally sanctioned according to
local social norms (Bicchieri, Lindemans, & Jiang, 2014). For example, it is frequently
argued that the existence of rampant corruption depends largely on whether people
think others are corrupt as well, not on whether it is generally unacceptable or illegal
(Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti, & Van Lange, 2015).
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gives a part of their earnings to their wives to keep as secret
money/koseliya. . . they tell them not to spend that money on any-
thing and even tell their wives to ask for money from the guardian
of the household instead of spending their own money, and not to
tell anybody else about it too. . . they keep secret money/koseliya
for themselves, for their children and for their future. . . so that if
they would have to live separately from their family in the future
then their. . . family should not suffer from a crisis. . . and they
should not have to ask for money from others.
[husband 6, Dahak]
Since sons are ‘meant’ to stay with their wives in their parents’
house for their entire lifetime in the patrilineal Maithili family,
household separation is widely perceived as a traumatic break-
down of the traditional household unit. Female guardians and
senior male brothers-in-law felt that husbands should never listen
to their wives, because this would create rifts between household
members and ultimately lead to household separation. For exam-
ple, one husband blamed his brother’s wife for the decision to sep-
arate from the wider household:
Husband: After the marriage of my second brother, a woman from
another household entered our home and due to her, changes
occurred that were the beginning of the destruction of our house-
hold . . . She told my brother to separate from the family and then
he separated after one year being married.
[husband 2, Dahak]
Nonetheless, despite all the best efforts of the extended house-
hold members, they could only do so much to prevent a deter-
mined junior couple from progressing towards separation.
Separated daughters-in-law often described a newfound ability
to make autonomous decisions on consumption and leisure time
and an increased ability to move about in public spaces and make
purchases according to their own desires.
Daughter-in-law: I used to offer food to each family member and,
while doing household work, if anything had been overlooked or
some mistake had been done then they swore at me and argued
with me. After I had cooked, I had to wait for all the household
members to eat and then eat last myself. Now, if I want to cook,
then I cook and if I want to eat, I eat.
[daughter-in-law 5, Kote]
Interviewer: Does anyone from your family ever tell you not to go
out to buy goods or not to go to any other place? Do your family
members allow you to go outside?
Daughter-in-law: There is no-one in the family [to tell me what to
do]. I make decisions about my own household, so no-one can say
things like that to me. I do everything on my own . . . [except] once I
fell sick and my husband bought goods for the household, but when
I got better, I again made purchases myself.
[daughter-in-law 3, Jamal]
Husbands similarly found their financial autonomy increased as
their parents stopped being involved in their financial and non-
financial matters. Mothers-in-law, on the other hand, lamented
the loss of financial support and the termination of personal
relationships.
Mother-in-law: As we live separately from each other, we are like
neighbors now. Everybody knows that if your son is separated from
you, then he will be like a neighbor for you, but nothing more than
this . . . It is the rule of the community that if you live separately
from your family, then you also want to take your own decisions.
[mother-in-law 5, Kote]5. Discussion
In this article, we sought to describe and analyze the complex
social processes involved in young married women’s negotiations
over cash in the rural Nepali household. In line with previous liter-
ature on women’s strategies for control over money (Chowbey,
2017; Eroglu, 2009; Kabeer, 1997), financial secrecy was an impor-
tant means of exerting agency and resisting total economic depen-
dency in a context where women’s dependent status served as
strong deterrents to overt confrontation with other household
members (Jack, Pokharel, & Subba, 2010; Mandelbaum, 1993). In
contrast to previous accounts, we found a central role for intergen-
erational power dynamics, where husbands and daughters-in-law
acted as allies in a struggle for financial power against the financial
guardian of the household. Junior wives and husbands who felt dis-
satisfied with the implementation of the patriarchal bargain in
their household were led to accumulate secret savings with a pos-
sible view to eventually separating from the joint household and
forming their own nuclear household. Extended household mem-
bers strongly opposed this, because they benefited from being able
to access the income of the junior couple and thus closely policed
their access to cash, which only further strengthened incentives to
accumulate secret money, potentially causing a self-reinforcing
spiral. These dynamics may be important to take into account
when designing policy and research into women’s economic
empowerment.
Our results extend previous theories of financial secrecy, which
have hitherto seen women’s covert resistance to patriarchy as ‘a
curious combination of ritualistic adherence to traditional norms
in public on the one hand and private mockery and manipulation
of husbands on the other’ (emphasis mine) (Bolak, 1997; Eroglu,
2009), while ignoring intergenerational power dynamics in the
joint household. For example, Eroglu (2009) listed reasons for
accumulating secret money, such as preventing husbands from
wasting their income, avoiding blame for misusing visible funds,
or protecting their husband’s masculine pride, that might not apply
in a context where daughters-in-law obtained secret money
through the co-operation of their husband.
Nonetheless, our finding that the mother-in-law, rather than
the father-in-law, often assumes the role of financial guardian res-
onated with previous studies on money management, where
women in low-income nuclear families were referred to as ‘finan-
cial managers’ (Hoodfar, 1988), ‘family bankers’ (Hoodfar, 1988) or
family ‘cashiers’ (Zelizer, 1989) and the ability to receive and nur-
ture household income was found central to women’s identity
(Busby, 1999). Our results also replicated Singh’s (2006) observa-
tion in urban India that senior in-laws typically held financial
decision-making power over the junior couple in the joint house-
hold. That junior wives had to ask for and justify access to cash
on a case-by-case basis resembled the ‘irregular dole system’
reported by Singh and Bhandari (2012). Previous quantitative stud-
ies in South Asia have also highlighted the role of intergenerational
power dynamics in affecting the autonomy of both women and
men (Sen & Rastogi, 2006), including differences in female
decision-making power between nuclear and extended households
(Debnath, 2015; Mookerjee, 2017). A survey of pregnant, married
women from our context showed in-laws made major financial
decisions in 62% of joint households without the involvement of
the junior couple (Gram et al., 2018).
On the whole, we expect our results to generalize most plausi-
bly to rural households in the Plains of Nepal, North India, Pakistan
and Bangladesh (Mandelbaum, 1993) – including the 33 million
people in Nepal and North India who identify as Maithili – where
the main structural parameters examined in our study have been
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the family estate when the junior couple moves out, seclusion
norms stigmatizing women’s entry into public spaces, and large
gender disparities in access to economic opportunities outside
the household (Acharya & Bennett, 1983; Agarwal, 1994; Dyson
& Moore, 1983; Mandelbaum, 1993).11 While the exact form of
money management system observed in our study may not transfer
verbatim to all such contexts, we still expect the patriarchal bargain
to play a role in shaping intra-household negotiations over cash. The
aforementioned structural features have also been observed in
Newar and high-caste Hindu populations in the Hills of Nepal
(Acharya & Bennett, 1983; Bennett, 1983), but caution should be
applied transferring our results to Tibeto-Burman populations who
differ significantly on female seclusion norms and inheritance rights
(Acharya & Bennett, 1983; Agarwal, 1994).12,13
Anthropologists have long hypothesized that a shift from feudal
land practices to competitive cash-based economies in South Asia
would be accompanied by the break-up of the extended household,
as sub-factions began to dispute the allocation of money or refuse
to put their external earnings into a common household budget
(Bailey, 1958; Epstein, 1962; Goode, 1963). Kandiyoti (1988) her-
self predicted a breakdown of the prevailing patriarchal bargain
due to ‘the impact of new market forces, capital penetration in
rural areas . . . or processes of chronic immiseration’ (p. 281). A sur-
vey of separated households in a rural village in Bangladesh found
that 36% of respondents cited economic pressures as the most
important cause of separation (Khuda, 1985). However, an analysis
of nationally representative survey data from India from 1992 to
2006 revealed that the proportion of married women aged 15–29
residing in patrilocal extended households only decreased margin-
ally from 64% in 1992–1993 to 56% in 2005–2006 (Allendorf,
2013).
Rather than view household separation over economic issues as
a sign of the decline of the joint household institution, it seems
more likely that such processes serve as an ‘escape valve’ for
households where junior wives and husbands experience unbear-
able financial insecurity and exploitation in service of the patriar-11 In line with a considerable body of qualitative, ethnographic research (Baker,
Edwards, & Doidge, 2012; Small, 2009; Mookherji & LaFond, 2013) we use theory-
based generalisation. We thus ask questions about whether the core logic of our
argument transfers to other situations. Where the listed structural parameters are
present, we can more plausibly expect our argument to transfer. Note, although
foreign labor migration may have contributed to the observed power dynamics in our
study, we excluded it from our list of structural parameters. Our core argument
concerning the influence of the patriarchal bargain on junior women’s control over
cash does not fundamentally hinge on the existence of male labor migration. In
contexts with low levels of male labor migration, junior husbands may continue to
have an incentive to ally with their wives over secret savings, if they are expected to
give up control over earned income to senior household members.
12 Our findings contrast with Vera-Sanso’s (2005) study of low-caste, landless
laborers in urban Tamil Nadu who reported junior couples from joint households
declining their in-laws’ requests for financial support and declaring that husbands
had a stronger duty towards care of their wives than their parents. Differences in
context may account for this, as gender norms in North India have traditionally been
considered more liberal than those in South India (Dyson & Moore, 1983;
Mandelbaum, 1993; Bennett, 1983). Differences in economic context may also have
played a role, as low-caste, landless laborers may have little inheritance property to
offer as leverage over their own children.
13 Gender disparities in access to earning opportunities may have been exacerbated
in our sample by the perinatal condition of daughters-in-law (see endnote 6); thus,
women with older children may have had greater mobility. We are currently
conducting a pilot study to design and collect quantitative indicators on women’s
access to cash in the household that is embedded in a cohort study of mothers of
newborn children over a period of six years. This study provides an opportunity for
validating the generalizability of our results to a wider geographical context and for
studying women with older children using complementary quantitative methods. In
general, future quantitative researchers may be able to create new revealed-
preference models for intra-household bargaining (Doss, 2013) or new lab-in-the-
field experiments to elicit preferences for hiding money (Said, Mahmud, d’Adda, &
Chaudhry, 2017) inspired by our results.chal bargain. Nonetheless, while separated daughters-in-law often
narrated their journey from daughter-in-law in a joint household
to wife in a nuclear household as a story of emancipation and
empowerment, the same daughters-in-law all held an expectation
that they themselves would become mothers-in-law with atten-
dant privileges over their own daughters-in-law in due time. At
the same time, these daughters-in-law were now under the
guardianship of their husbands, who have also been found in prior
studies to potentially abuse their economic privileges (Chowbey,
2017; Kabeer, 1997; Singh & Bhandari, 2012).
In our sample, separated daughters-in-law sometimes down-
played power and control by their husband while accentuating
such behavior by their mother-in-law. For example, they might ini-
tially state that no-one made decisions for them, but subsequently
acknowledge – when prompted – that their husband had to be
obeyed. Since the patriarchal bargain explicitly pits daughter-in-
law against mother-in-law, while rendering men’s benefits from
patriarchy invisible (Kandiyoti, 1988), our respondents may have
been habituated to ‘seeing’ abuse by their mother-in-law and
‘unseeing’ abuse by their husband. Respondents in joint house-
holds may have considered it too ambitious to aspire to equality
with their husbands, when they had not even freed themselves
from their in-laws.14
Our study thus raises broader theoretical questions on the role
of intergenerational power relationships in perpetuating patri-
archy (Kandiyoti, 1988). The institution of household separation
does not fundamentally challenge patriarchal norms mandating
the subservience of junior women to senior women, nor does it
alter expectations that women are subordinated to men in the
household hierarchy. Instead, it may even perpetuate patriarchy
through encouraging women to aim ‘for a change in the
distribution of power, leaving intact the power structure itself’
(p. 81) (Irigaray, 1985), as junior women gain their autonomy at
the expense of senior women’s access to financial protection
(Vera-Sanso, 2005). True economic empowerment of South Asian
women may require local women and men, activists, researchers
and policy-makers to collectively reconsider the impact of
intergenerational power relations on women’s control over cash.
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